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his issue of EAP begins our 19th year. We 
thank readers renewing their subscriptions 
and include a reminder for “delinquents.” 
 The issue begins with architect Julio Ber-
mudez’s report on Architecture Alive, a research 
project exploring “extraordinary architectural ex-
periences.” To gather descriptions of these experi-
ences, Bermudez has set up an on-line survey. He 
requests that EAP readers and other interested indi-
viduals participate in this survey, the web address of 
which is provided in the project’s overview on p. 4.  
Our three feature articles this issue focus on the 
theme of place. Geographer Edward Relph reviews 
philosopher Jeff Malpas’ Heidegger’s Topology, a 
study of the significance of place in Heidegger’s 
philosophy. In turn, Malpas responds to Relph’s re-
view. Last, educator John Cameron describes his 
deepening involvement with place as he and his 
partner restore a homestead on Bruny Island, just 
off the southeastern coast of Australia’s Tasmania. 
 
Festschrift for Karsten Harries 
The work of philosopher Karsten Harries plays a 
pivotal role in phenomenological studies of archi-
tecture and place. The current issue of the German 
architectural e-journal, Wolkenkuckucksheim, is de-
voted to Harries and includes a digital version of his 
The Bavarian Rococo Church: Between Faith and 
Aestheticism, originally published by Yale Univer-
sity Press in 1983. Contributors to the issue include: 
Hagi Kenaan (“The Ground’s Hidden Surface”); 
David Kolb (“Borders and Centers in the Age of 
Mobility”); David Leatherbarrow (“Architecture, 
Ecology, and Ethics”); James McQuillan (“Karsten 
Harries: Beyond Care—An Architecture of Love”); 
Juhani Pallasmaa (“The Space of Time: Mental 
Time in Architecture”); and David Seamon & Enku 
Mulugeta Assefa (“Karsten Harries’ Natural Sym-
bols as a Means for Interpreting Architecture”). The 
issue is available at: 
www.tu-cottbus.de/theo/Wolke/eng/Subjects/subject.html#A1 
 
Below: sketches by Chinese artist and cartoonist Feng Zikai 
(1898-1975) of Shanghai’s alley life; clockwise from top left: 
Lowering a basket to purchase goods from a hawker; a hun-
tun seller with his mobile kitchen on a shoulder pole; a peddler 
selling straw mats; a street barber cleaning his customer’s 
ears. These drawings appear in Chunlan Zhao’s “From Shi-
kumen to New-style: A Re-reading of Lilong Housing in Mod-
ern Shanghai,” a chapter in J. Madge & A. Peckham’s Narra-
tive Architecture—see p. 3. “Lilong” can roughly be trans-
lated as “alley-living,” whereby the narrow streets and alleys 
of Shanghai’s dense urban neighborhoods became “a shared 
living room and multifunctional space, through which a par-
ticular local dwelling culture was created” (p. 453). 
T 
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We are grateful to the following readers who have 
contributed more than the base subscription for 
2008. As always, we could not continue without 
your generous support, and we thank you all! 
 
Anonymous    Tom Barrie 
Michael Branch   Linda Carson 
L. J. Evenden    Kirk Gastinger 
Marie Gee    Steen Halling 
Alvin Holm    Susan Hopkins 
Susan Ingham    Sara Ishikawa 
Michael Kazanjian   David Kermani 
Evelyn Koblentz   Ellen Lowery   
Ted Lowitz    Anne Niemiec   
Doug Porteous    Carolyn Prorok  
J. Reser     Leanne Rivlin 
Mark Rosenbaum   Gwendolyn Scott 
Eva Simms    Charlene Spretnak 
Ian Wight     Justin Winkler 
 
Conference Presenters Needed! 
There are two upcoming conferences that EAP read-
ers might wish to attend and contribute paper pres-
entations to. The 27th International Human Sci-
ences Research Conference will be held 11-14 
June 2008, at Ramapo College in Mahwah, New 
Jersey, near New York City. Because of its small 
size, this conference is always a great pleasure intel-
lectually and communally. EAP editor David Sea-
mon is organizing a special session on Goethean 
science and would be happy to help with other “en-
vironmental” sessions that EAP readers might want 
to organize. If so, please let him know by February 




Another upcoming conference to which EAP read-
ers might wish to contribute is the  2008 meeting of 
the International Association for Environmental 
Philosophy (IAEP), to be held in Pittsburgh, 19-20 
October, immediately following the annual meet-
ings of SPEP (Society for Phenomenology and Ex-
istential Philosophy) and SPHS (Society for Phe-
nomenology and the Human Sciences), 16-18 Octo-
ber. The double session sponsored by EAP at the 
recent IAEP November Chicago meeting was well 
attended, and the five presentations were varied and 
interesting. Seamon would like to organize another 
EAP session at the Pittsburgh meetings, and readers 
interested in participating should contact him as 
soon as possible, certainly by February 1. Con-
fernce information is at:  
www.environmentalphilosophy.org 
 
Items of Interest 
The conference, Thinking through Nature: Phi-
losophy for an Endangered World, will be held 
19-22 June 2008, at the University of Oregon in 
Eugene. The conference is sponsored by the Inter-
national Association of Environmental Philosophy 
(IAEP). Key themes include: Environmental ethics; 
aesthetics of natural and built environments; envi-
ronmental restoration; architecture, place, and 
dwelling; traditional ecological knowledge; eco-
criticism; ecophenomenology; and environmental 
metaphysics and theology. Keynote speakers in-
clude Gary Paul Nabhan, Director, Center for Sus-
tainable Environments, Northern Arizona Univer-
sity; and Alberto Pérez-Gómez, Architecture Pro-
gram, McGill University. For further information, 
contact Ted Toadvine, Philosophy & Environ-
mental Studies, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 
97403-1295; Toadvine@uoregon.edu 
 
The International Association for the Study of 
Environment, Space, and Place will hold its 4th 
annual conference, 25-27 April 2008, at Towson 
University in Towson, Maryland. The conference 
theme is tourism. Abstracts for paper sessions are 
due February 10. Contact: Troy Paddock at: 
paddockt1@southernct.edu. 
 
The Journal of Architectural Education will pub-
lish a thematic issue on “Immateriality in Archi-
tecture” in late 2008. The prospectus reads in part: 
“Can today’s representational media emulate the 
ineffable? How can we distinguish between the nu-
minous and the merely luminous? Will new devel-
opments in the sciences, psychology, and philoso-
phy bring new insights to the question of the imma-
terial in our increasingly material culture? The edi-
tors seek critical responses to the difficult task of 
working materially with artifacts and places that are 
also tangibly immaterial.” For readers interested in 
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submitting manuscripts, contact the issue’s editors: 
Thomas Barrie at: tom_barrie@ncsu.edu;   Julio 
Bermudez at: bermudez@arch.utah.edu. 
 
Interdisciplinary Design and Research is a new 
peer-reviewed e-journal on interdisciplinary design 
sponsored by the Interdisciplinary Design Institute 
at Washington State University, Spokane. Volumes 
1 and 2 consider “Design and Health” and “Design 
and Livability,” respectively. The editors welcome 
research articles and design projects addressing any 
facet of interdisciplinary design relating to any di-
mension of life experience. For more information, 
go to: www.idrp.wsu.edu/index.html. 
 
Phenomenology & Practice is a new human sci-
ence e-journal dedicated to the study of the lived 
experience of a broad range of human practices—
for example, pedagogy, design, counseling, psy-
chology, social work, and health science. Increas-
ingly, researchers and practitioners are adapting in-
terpretive methodologies to address questions re-
lated to practice, and Phenomenology & Practice 
serves as a forum for this work. For further informa-
tion: http://www.phandpr.org/index.php/pandp/index. 
 
Patterns in Applied Phenomenology (PAPH) is a 
new book series devoted to works in which phe-
nomenological methods, concepts, and research are
used to address concrete practical problems, or phe-
nomenological insights are used to develop “phe-
nomenologically-informed practices.” Further in-
formation at:   paph@zetabooks.com.  
  
Citations Received 
Vincent B. Canizaro, ed., 2007. Architectural Re-
gionalism: Collected Writings on Place, Identity, 
Modernity, and Tradition. NY: Princeton Architec-
tural Press. 
 
This collection is said to bring “together over 40 key refer-
ences, illustrating the full range of ideas embodied by the term 
architectural regionalism. Authored by leading critics, histori-
ans, and architects, the collection represents the history of 
regionalist thinking in architecture from the early 20th century 
to today.” Includes some region-focused patterns from Chris-
topher Alexander’s Pattern Language and Juhani Pallasmaa’s 
“Tradition and Modernity: The Feasibility of Regional Archi-
tecture in Post-Modern Society” but, strangely, provides noth-
ing by Edward Relph, Robert Mugerauer, or other phenome-
nologically-inspired writers. A wide-ranging hodgepodge with 
no clear conceptual focus. 
 
David A. Gruenewald & Gregory A. Smith, eds., 
2007. Place-Based Education in the Global Age: 
Local Diversity. London: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
 
The 15 chapters of this volume focus on the theory and prac-
tice of place-based education and highlight three themes: un-
derstanding place-based pedagogy as part of a broader social 
movement known as the “new localism,” which “aims toward 
reclaiming the significance of the local in the global age”; 
making links between ecological awareness and concerns 
about equity and cultural diversity; presenting examples of 
place-based learning in action. Includes EAP contributor John 
Cameron’s “Learning Country: A Case Study of Australian 
Place-Responsive Education.” 
 
Nigel Hoffmann, 2007. Goethe’s Science of Living 
Form. Harlemville, NY: Adonis Press. 
 
“…a disciplined search of Goethe’s methodological writing as 
well as of other sources of phenomenological thinking [to de-
velop] a method for a systematic practice of landscape study.” 
The real-world focus is Yabby Ponds, an Australian locale. 
 
Elizabeth A. Johnson & Michael W. Klemens, eds., 
2005. Nature in Fragments: The Legacy of Sprawl. 
NY: Columbia Univ. Press. 
 
Contributors focus on “the impact of sprawl on biodiversity 
and the measures that can be taken to alleviate it.” 
 
James Made & Andrew Peckham, eds. Narrative 
Architecture: A Retrospective Anthology. NY: 
Routledge, 2006. 
 
This collection assembles articles from the Journal of Archi-
tecture that are said to “stand out after ten years of publica-
tion.” Themes include: architects’ design practice; issues of 
materiality; narratives of domesticity; the sociology of archi-
tectural practice; and identity and appropriation of place. Note 
the drawing on p. 1 of this EAP is from this collection. 
 
Roger Paden, 2007. Mysticism and Architecture: 
Wittgenstein and the Meanings of the Palais Ston-
borough. NY: Lexington Books. 
 
This philosopher studies “philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and the Viennese house that he helped design and build for his 
sister shortly after he abandoned philosophy for more practical 
activities.” Paden argues that the house “belongs to neither 
architectural Modernism nor Postmodernism, but is instead 
caught between the two movements.” The first volume in 
Robert Mugerauer’s “toposophia” series (See EAP, 17, 2: 2-3). 
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rchitecture Live is a research project focus-
ing on “extraordinary architectural experi-
ences.” The emphasis is transformative phe-
nomenologies of architectural delight, a phenome-
non that by its very nature is largely intangible, 
qualitative, experiential—even esoteric. What is 
architectural delight? How does it take place? Why 
and when does it happen? What is it like as an ex-
perience? 
ermudez 
Architecture Live proposes that realizing the na-
ture of delight needs to go no further than our own 
live experience of architecture and may be greatly 
facilitated by studying the most dramatic cases 
available—namely, extraordinary architectural ex-
periences. 
Specifically, the goals of Architecture Live are: 
 
• To develop appreciation for the profoundly qualitative in 
architecture; 
• To improve understanding of both the ordinary and the 
extraordinary in architectural phenomenology; 
• To assist in making environments that foster strong aes-
thetic experiences. 
 
Architectural Live pursues these goals by: 
 
1. Studying non-dual aesthetic events. Trustworthy testimo-
nies of extraordinary architectural experiences consis-
tently describe situations involving no separation between 
subject and object. These experiences can be felt as unify-
ing, intimate, and even transcendental identifications of 
self and other. 
2. Developing a thorough 
phenomenological account 
of architecture that coordi-
nates what philosopher Ken 
Wilber (Integral Psychol-
ogy, 2000) has termed 
“first-, second-, and third-
person experiences.” Archi-
tecture is ordinarily experienced in third-person—i.e., as 
an “it” fundamentally different from “me” and perceptu-
ally, emotionally, and intellectually detached from “me.” 
Traditional phenomenological methods enable us to move 
from such a limiting and instrumentalist view of architec-
ture (as an “it”) to one of materialized intentionality that 
actively interacts in a meaningful experiential conversa-
tion—a “you” and thus second person. There is also the 
possibility of a total identification of self and other (i.e., 
the building)—an event in which subject and object are 
merged into one (I = you = it). 
3. Examining the role of the built environment as a potential 
gateway to transcendental insights. 
 
As part of this work, I would like to ask EAP 
readers to complete a web-based survey on extraor-
dinary architectural experiences. My aim is to col-
lect a substantial number of qualitative descriptions 
to support and challenge my research. My interest is 
in the actual experience (or its absence). Complet-
ing the survey should take no longer than 10 min-
utes. Privacy of participants is guaranteed, and re-
sults from the study will be made available to all 
participants. The survey is available at:  
 
http://studentvoice.com/utah/ExtraordinaryArchitecture 
    
This research is described in greater detail at: 
http://faculty.arch.utah.edu/alive/. For questions or 
information, contact Dr. Julio Bermudez, University 
of Utah College of Architecture + Planning, Salt 
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Disclosing the Ontological Depth of Place: 




Relph is a geographer who teaches in the Division of Social Sciences at Scarborough College, the University of 
Toronto. His writings have been instrumental in demonstrating the value of a phenomenological approach for en-
vironmental and architectural concerns. His books include Place and Placelessness (1976), one of the earliest and 
most accessible phenomenologies of place; Rational Landscapes and Humanistic Geography (1981), a powerful 
explication of the Heideggerian notion of appropriation as a potential vehicle for a lived environmental ethic 
grounded in respect and care for the Other—what Relph calls “environmental humility”; and The Modern Urban 




 few years ago in the Tate Modern Gallery 
in London, there was an installation of the 
reconstruction of an explosion of an ordi-
nary garden shed. The room was filled with frag-
ments of wood, tools, equipment and gardening 
stuff, some recognizable, others not—suspended 
from the ceiling to recreate a three-dimensional, 
frozen moment of the explosion that visitors could 
walk through. Something ordinary and everyday, all 
in pieces, disconnected except by point of origin. 
I recently began a comprehensive review of 
what has been written about place in the last 20 
years and it was like walking into the aftermath of 
an academic explosion. What had once been a rea-
sonably coherent body of thought, grounded in phe-
nomenology and mostly the concern of humanistic 
geographers and environmental psychologists, 
seems to have flown off in all directions.  
For example, Doreen Massey flatly rejects the 
idea of places as sites of nostalgia and proposes in-
stead that they are nodes in networks of social rela-
tions. Altman and Low define place as settings to 
which individuals are emotionally and culturally 
attached. For David Harvey “[p]lace, in whatever 
guise, is like space and time, a social construct.” 
GIS scientist Pragya Agarwal claims that “[p]laces 
are proximal spaces,” while artist Lucy Lippard 
writes that “[p]lace for me is the locus of desire.” 
Neuroscientist John Zeisel uses MRI to locate 
where in the brain our sense of place resides.  
What I think has happened is that, because 
place is an everyday phenomenon with no precise 
definition, it can be bent to fit any methodological 
or disciplinary bias. For me, the only way to make 
some sense of this confusion is to get back to what 
preceded the big bang, to return to place as a phe-
nomenon of experience and seek clarification there. 
For this, Jeff Malpas has become a valuable guide, 
including his most recent work, Heidegger’s Topol-
ogy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006).  
 Over the last decade, Malpas and other phi-
losophers—most notably Ed Casey, Ingrid Stefano-
vic and Robert Mugerauer—have established that 
place has been an important philosophical concept 
since the origins of Western philosophy, that it is 
best understood phenomenologically, and that Hei-
degger’ s writings are crucial in this understanding. 
In Heidegger’s Topology, Malpas takes this in-
terest in place one step further by arguing that Hei-
degger’s thought is not just helpful in elucidating 
place, but that place is at the root of Heidegger’ s 
philosophy of being. Being and place are inextrica-
bly bound together in that being emerges only 
through place; and place, through being. 
 
hough Heidegger’s Topology will no doubt be 
contested by some Heidegger scholars, I find 
the work original and immediately compelling. 
Now that Malpas has brought the point to light, it is 
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fully latent in all phases of Heidegger’s writing. It is 
manifest in the language of Dasein (“a ‘da’ , a there, 
a topos,” p. 14) and in the metaphors of “clearing,” 
“way,” “dwelling,” and “homecoming” that com-
prise what Malpas calls Heidegger’s “topology,” a 
word Malpas uses not in its mathematical sense but 
in the sense of “a saying of place”—an attempt to 
illuminate the place in which we always and already 
find ourselves (p. 33). 
This effort, Malpas suggests, is not unlike the 
work of a traditional topographer attempting to in-
scribe a place from within through survey, triangu-
lation, and traverse. Topology is thus a variant of 
phenomenology, which Heidegger described in 
1919 as “the investigation of life itself.”  
 For non-philosophers or readers not reasonably 
familiar with Heidegger’s philosophy or obscure 
language, this will not be an easy book. Heidegger’s 
thought deals with what is near to us—with being, 
existence and the everyday, immediate encounter 
with a world that is already differentiated and con-
nected, a world that is obvious but so rich and com-
plex it is extremely difficult to write about. 
But whether you like Heidegger’s writing or 
not, whether you find his contact with Nazism ab-
horrent or not, there is very little doubt among phi-
losophers about the originality and depth of his 
thinking. Malpas covers the fifty-year span of Hei-
degger’s writing and teaching, including many of 
his lectures available only in archives. The general 
approach is chronological, and about a third of the 
book discusses Heidegger’s earlier thought, espe-
cially in Being and Time; another third is about the 
middle period of the 1930s and 1940s, including the 
matter of Heidegger’s brief infatuation with Na-
tional Socialism; and the last third is about Heideg-
ger’s later thought that embraced poetry, dwelling, 
and the questioning of technology. 
It is this last phase that is most interesting for 
many architects and other non-philosophers reading 
Heidegger because it speaks most directly to the 
world we experience in the present age. 
 
alpas’  aim is to establish that the foundation 
of Heidegger’s philosophy is the recognition 
that, in finding ourselves in the world, we find our-
selves already in place. Place is not just a bit of 
space or a function of affectivity and is certainly 
more than a node in social networks. Place is nei-
ther something subjective and claimed by feelings, 
nor is it objective location. In fact, it precedes all 
notions of subjectivity and objectivity. It is a com-
plex unity, integral to being, and encountered expe-
rientially as simultaneously unified, differentiated 
from yet connected with other places, and gathering 
together things, people, and our own lives. 
Heidegger, of course, wrote and thought in 
German and used a number of words that can be 
translated into English as place—“Platz,” “Stelle,” 
“Gegend,” “Statte,” “Ort,” and “Ortschaft.” 
Though they have different shades of meaning, 
these words can all be translated as “place” in Eng-
lish. “Platz” and “Stelle,” which Heidegger used 
mostly in his earlier works, mean something like 
“position.” “Ort” and “Ortschaft” (the latter liter-
ally translates as “placescape”) he used mostly in 
his later writings, and the terms mean something 
like ‘settled locality’  with the sense of things be-
longing together. 
Since in English the word “place” itself has a 
variety of meanings, such as location, setting, posi-
tion, situation, social role, and context, there are 
many possibilities for slippage in translation. Hei-
degger’s thought, however, seems to be an attempt 
to delve through and behind language to reflect 
upon what it is to experience being in the world. 
Malpas argues that this originary experience of 
being is an experience of place: “The question of 
being is the question of how beings can emerge in 
their interrelatedness and their distinctiveness from 
one another” (p. 14). Beings and things in their con-
crete manifestations are always gathered together in 
a place; we experience them as simultaneously 
similar to and different from other things with 
which they are related, and we experience a particu-
lar place as simultaneously distinct from yet similar 
to and interrelated with other places. 
At any given moment we see, hear, and touch a 
specific assemblage of chairs, windows, buildings, 
cars, people, plants, and so on; the world is always 
and inevitably encountered in its rich particularity, 
unity, and connectedness. For example, hearing as 
an everyday experience involves the sound of some 
specific thing, situation, or event—in Being and 
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motorcycle or the North wind and says that “[i]t re-
quires a very artificial and complicated frame of 
mind to ‘hear’  a ‘pure noise’ .”  
 The idea of “world” is central to Heidegger’s 
thought. For him “is” did not mean everything that 
is but Umwelt—an environing world of self, others, 
and things that has a certain order and orientation. 
So a return to the things themselves, the watchword 
of phenomenology, means a return to the world it-
self—the one experienced prior to the onset of an 
artificial frame of mind. In this return, truth consists 
not of agreement about the state of things but of 
disclosure—letting beings be seen as they are in 
themselves. Malpas writes that because beings al-
ready exist in places, “the thinking of truth… also 








hile Malpas demonstrates that the topological 
aspects of Heidegger’s thinking can be traced 
in all phases of his writing, they are most explicit in 
the later works in which Heidegger became increas-
ingly concerned with ideas of event, dwelling, and 
gathering. Malpas suggests that, for Heidegger, 
“event” and “place” often mean the same; they are 
both the starting point for thinking and both offer 
possibilities for disclosure, appropriation, appear-
ing, and gathering. 
Place, therefore, loses any sense of located enti-
ties and comes to mean “that open, cleared yet 
bounded region in which we find ourselves gathered 
together with other persons and things, and in which 
we are opened up to the world and the world to us” 
(p. 221). A place is where being happens—an event 
that is continually changing and open to question.  
 The idea of dwelling that is so prominent in 
Heidegger’s later writings is clearly topological. 
Dwelling embraces a number of meanings, includ-
ing cherishing, protecting, caring for, and looking 
after. To build involves a productive relationship to 
one place, but to dwell means to be in a certain rela-
tion to place. Dwelling involves an ontological 
sense of place that illuminates and is illuminated by 
the place-specific processes of building, yet also 
includes a grasp of mortality and the aspects of the 
world that go beyond human being. 
From Heidegger’s Topology 
 
[Heideggerian topology is] essentially a meditative con-
cern with the way in which a particular environing 
“world” comes forth around a particular mode of “em-
placement” in that world. Heideggerian topology can 
thus be understood as an attempt to evoke and illuminate 
that placed abode. In this respect, topology is an attempt 
to illuminate a place in which we already find ourselves 
and in which other things are also disclosed to us (p. 34). 
 
[T]he place … in which philosophical questioning first 
arises is the place in which we first find ourselves—that 
place is not an abstract world of ideas, not a world of 
sense-data or “impressions,” not a world of theoretical 
“objects” nor of mere causal relata. 
       In finding ourselves “in” the world, we find our-
selves already “in” a place, already given over to and 
involved with things, with persons, with our lives. On 
this basis the central questions of philosophy, questions 
of being and existence, as well as of ethics and virtue, 
must themselves take their determination and their start-
ing point from this same place (p. 40). 
The latter are referred to figuratively by Hei-
degger as the earth, the sky, and the gods—terms 
open to wide interpretation but which can respec-
tively be taken to mean non-human nature, open-
ness, and the ineffable. It is through these aspects of 
world that human beings are able “to grasp their 
own being as implicated in being that goes beyond a 
human life” (p. 275). Dwelling might therefore be 
described as an enlightened understanding of being-
in-place. In turn, building that is informed by dwell-
ing will tread lightly and be responsive to the con-
text of a specific place.  
Dwelling stands in opposition to what Heideg-
ger called “the oblivion of being” in the modern 
world and which Malpas suggests is “perhaps the 
most important theme” in his later work (p. 279). A 
consequence of the framework of rationalistic tech-
nology is a forgetfulness of being in which instru-
mental notions of efficiency, measurement, and re-
serves of resources come to treat the world as an 
object and a source of raw materials. 
Similarly, new technologies of communication 
shrink distances. “Yet,” Heidegger wrote, “the fran-
tic abolition of all distance brings us no nearness. 
Short distance is not nearness. Nor is great distance 
remoteness.” Place is reduced to spatial position and 









hile I find this later part of Heidegger’ s work 
appealing because it reinforces my own 
doubts about modern placelessness, I also think it is 
his most superficial thinking. It is almost as though 
Heidegger looked up, noticed that the world he 
lived in didn’t have much resemblance to the one he 
was thinking about, didn’t like it much and felt 
obliged to comment. 
He seems to have shifted from rigorous phe-
nomenological description to a selective historical 
judgment that implies that the quality of dwelling in 
classical Greece, as manifest in a few archeological 
sites, was somehow better than that manifest in 
power stations along the Rhine in the 1950s. I know 
of no way to distinguish between the quality of 
dwelling of, for example, a peasant living in a 
squalid hut on the fringes of the Black Forest in the 
13th century and worried about surviving next win-
ter, and that of a single mother living in social hous-
ing in South Chicago and worried about whether the 
food bank can get her family through next month.  
 Malpas mirrors Heidegger’s critique of modern 
technology. He writes that one of its obvious conse-
quences is a disruption of our sense of place, which 
he discusses in terms of loss of nearness, forgetful-
ness of being, and an inability to grasp limits to 
human activity. As a way to escape this disruption, 
he refers to Heidegger’s idea of “composure toward 
technology”—in other words, a way of being that 
involves acceptance but not submission to technol-
ogy. He suggests that achieving such composure 
depends on poetic dwelling that involves “a return 
to the openness and indeterminacy of the world and 
to the experience of wonder” (p. 310). 
Given the forcefulness of his argument that 
place and being are inextricably linked, this conclu-
sion seems insubstantial. But Heidegger seems to 
have been unable to suggest what to do next. His 
final essay was titled, “Only a god can save us”—a 
phrasing that was disingenuous and evasive. The 
essential point I take from Heidegger is not histori-
cal. The fact is that, in every age and in every indi-
vidual and in every place, there are tendencies to 
“the oblivion of being,” and it is always necessary 
to find appropriate ways of being, dwelling, and 
building that will challenge these tendencies. 
eidegger’s works can be read not only as an 
account of the links between place and being 
but also as a sustained, albeit largely implicit, cri-
tique of rationalism. There are many indications that 
industrial technologies have changed the relation-
ships between human beings and the world, and that 
this shift is related to the rise of rationalism in the 
last 400 years. Foucault and others have docu-
mented this rise and have pointed to indications that 
it has overstayed its welcome and begun to decline. 
Indeed, there is evidence of this decline in the very 
revival of interest in place as a phenomenon of ex-
perience (rather than as spatial location) that has 
occurred in the last 30 years and to which Heideg-
ger’s Topology is a substantial contribution. 
HW 
I am predisposed toward place in all its “irides-
cent, multiple, shifting character” (p. 37) and, in 
Heidegger’s Topology and his other work, Malpas 
discloses the ontological source for the fragments of 
the academic explosion of recent research on place 
and reset the grounds for future research. The result 
is a strong foundation for shifting the balance away 
from the rationalistic, calculative approach, in all its 
bureaucratic, corporate and climate-changing mani-
festations, to a view of the world that is responsible 
toward being and place.  
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n his review of my Heidegger’s Topology, Ed-
ward Relph acknowledges the importance of 
Heidegger’s thought in the contemporary turn to 
place within the humanities and social sciences, just 
as he acknowledges the importance of the philoso-
phical inquiry into place as such. Relph is also par-
ticularly generous in his estimation of the role of 
my work, in Heidegger’s Topology and elsewhere, 
in contributing to this renewed interest in place. 
Moreover, Relph provides a strikingly apt and 
vivid image of the way the concept of “place” has, 
in recent years, “exploded” across many different 
areas and disciplines in a proliferation of different 
forms and uses. While there are many works that 
deploy various senses of place and that also deline-
ate the detailed textures and forms of particular 
places, when it comes to the theoretical inquiry into 
place, the focus for the most part is not on place as 
such but either on the effects of place or on place 
itself as an effect of other processes. 
Relph notes that David Harvey, for instance, 
treats place as a social construction, claiming that 
the only interesting question then concerns the so-
cial processes that give rise to place (Harvey 1996, 
pp. 293-94). Here, place is nothing more than an 
effect. Doreen Massey, on the other hand, treats 
place, which she refuses to distinguish from space, 
as significant largely in terms of the consequences 
of our imagination of place (Massey 2005, esp. pp. 
5-8). Here, the effects of place are given priority. 
Even the work of a theorist such as Henri Le-
febvre (esp. Lefebvre 1991), so often cited as a key 
figure in the literature on place, turns out to be im-
portant, less for his elucidation of the concept than 
for the prioritization of space and place as accept-
able terms within critical discourse (moreover, in 
Lefebvre, one finds much the same treatment of 
space and place as effects of social and economic 
factors as is evident in Harvey’s own Lefebvrian-
inflected writing). Much the same is true of other 
prominent theorists such as Foucault and even 
Deleuze and Guattari. 
Part of Heidegger’s importance is the central 
role his work played in enabling the appearance of 
place (and space) as a key theoretical concept in 
writers such as Lefebvre and Foucault (a point that 
Stuart Elden’s work has done much to establish—
see, for instance, Elden 2001). Furthermore, Hei-
degger is one of the few philosophers and the only 
major 20th-century thinker to thematize place as 
such and to provide an analysis of its structure and 
significance—so much so that the later Heidegger 
could refer to his own work as a “topology of be-
ing.” For anyone interested in the attempt to say 
more about place than is available in the work of 
thinkers like Harvey and Massey (or Lefebvre and 
Foucault), Heidegger must be essential reading. 
 
et while Relph and I seem to be in agreement 
on the importance of Heidegger as a central 
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assessments of just what is most significant in Hei-
degger’ s treatment of place. 
Focusing on the concept of dwelling that looms 
so large in Heidegger’s later thinking, Relph ob-
serves that, while he finds this aspect of Heideg-
ger’s philosophy “appealing because it reinforces 
my own doubts about modern placelessness” (Relph 
1976, 1981), he nevertheless views it as “the most 
superficial” aspect of Heidegger’s thought. Relph 
takes the turn toward the concept of dwelling in 
later Heidegger as indicative of a shift from “rigor-
ous phenomenological description to a selective his-
torical judgment.” 
There is no doubt that there is a move away 
from a certain conception of phenomenology in 
Heidegger, although as I note toward the end of 
Heidegger’s Topology, there is an important sense in 
which a form of “phenomenological seeing” re-
mains central to all Heidegger’s thinking (Malpas, 
2006, pp. 307-8). I would, however, certainly dis-
pute Relph’s claim that what characterizes the later 
Heidegger is a shift to a “selective historical judg-
ment,” just as I would also take issue with Relph’s 
judgment as to the superficiality of the Heideg-
gerian account of dwelling. 
It is important to note that the concept of dwell-
ing is already present in Being and Time. In a brief 
and highly condensed passage in §12 (the main ele-
ments of which reappear in “Building Dwelling 
Thinking”), Heidegger distinguishes the way in 
which Dasein is “in” its world from the way in 
which a physical entity is “in” space (a sense of spa-
tial-physical “containment” that allows one thing to 
be said to be “in” another as the water is “in” the 
glass or the glass is “in” the room). Heidegger refers 
to this first sense of “in” in terms of dwelling (see 
Heidegger, 1962, H54). 
As deployed in Being and Time, the concept of 
dwelling remains obscure and problematic (Malpas 
2006, pp. 74-83).In Heidegger’s later thinking, 
however, it becomes one of the central ideas in his 
articulation of the enriched conception of place, one 
that includes both spatial and temporal elements to 
which human being is tied. In this respect, it is a 
mistake to see the notion of dwelling as tied to some 
pre-modern mode of life. Not only does this inter-
pretation render the concept superficial but also 
constitutes a highly partial reading of Heidegger’s 
articulation. 
What is at issue in Heidegger’s talk of dwelling 
is not a comparison in the “quality of life” between 
different historical periods but, rather, the nature of 
human being as intimately tied to place. Dwelling is 
Heidegger’s name for the topological mode of being 
that belongs to human being—not merely the hu-
man in some selected historical period but to the 
human “as such.” 
Precisely because humans dwell, the techno-
logical transformation of the world associated with 
modernity is such a challenge—an affront, even, to 
what it is to be human. The essential character of 
human life as dwelling is contradicted and obscured 
by the re-presentation of the human in terms of con-
sumption, productivity, preference, and utility. 
Moreover, just as Heidegger’s critique of tech-
nology is directed at a pervasive tendency that un-
derlies technology rather than being necessarily in-
stantiated in any particular technological device, so 
too is Heidegger’ s account of dwelling intended as 
a description of a fundamental mode of being rather 
than something to be instantiated only in certain 
lives rather than others. 
 
lthough Relph rejects the Heideggerian con-
cept of dwelling as “superficial,” he is rather 
more sympathetic toward Heidegger’s critique of 
technology that Relph reinterprets as a critique of 
“rationalism.” I think that the use of the latter term 
here is ill-advised. While there is a certain calcula-
tive rationality that Heidegger views as problematic, 
it is a serious mistake, even if a widespread one, to 
treat Heidegger as an ‘ anti-rationalist’  in any more 
general sense. There are, however, undoubtedly im-
portant points of convergence between Heidegger’s 
account of modern technology and its essence (what 
Heidegger refers to as “das Gestell”—“the Frame-
work”) and accounts to be found in the work of 
other 20th-century thinkers, including Foucault’s 
analysis of the rise of governmentality and the bio-
political; Weber’s description of the processes of 
rationalisation and bureaucratization; and Adorno’s 
account of instrumental rationality. 
Such convergence is perhaps unsurprising 
given the prevalence of ideas concerning the prob-
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thinking. What makes Heidegger’s account distinc-
tive, however, is the way in which the critique of 
technology is tied to a topological analysis of which 
Heidegger’s account of dwelling is an integral part. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the essay, 
“The Thing”—itself part of the original lecture se-
quence from which “The Question Concerning 
Technology” also came—which begins with Hei-
degger’s announcement of the phenomenon that has 
come to be known as “time-space compression” 
(Heidegger 1971, p. 163; Malpas 2006, pp. 278-79). 
Relph assumes a connection between “rational-
ism” and the loss of place. Not only does he associ-
ate such “rationalism” with placelessness, but he 
also sees evidence of the decline of “rationalism” in 
the resurgence of interest in place. It remains un-
clear, however, how or why such a connection 
should obtain. If my account is correct, Heidegger 
provides an answer that works through the elucida-
tion of place in relation to being and, in terms of 
dwelling, to human being. An answer is also pointed 
to through his analysis of the way in which technol-
ogy operates in relation to place. 
The fact that Relph seems not to have appreci-
ated this aspect of Heidegger’s topological thinking 
may indicate a deficiency in my presentation in 
Heidegger’s Topology. It may well be the case that 
much more needs to be said to bring out the com-
plexity and detail of Heidegger’s later thought, 
though I suspect that part of the difficulty here is 
that any writing on the later Heidegger still stands 
under the shadow of the often partial and superficial 
readings that have dominated much of the literature 
to date and that pervade the broader appropriation 
of Heideggerian thinking. 
 
elph finds the Heideggerian response to the 
danger of technological modernity (at least as I 
articulate that response in Heidegger’s Topology, in 
terms of the importance of ideas of openness, inde-
terminacy, wonder and, though not mentioned by 
Relph, questionability [Malpas 2006, pp. 302-03]) 
to be “insubstantial” and Heidegger’s own comment 
in the Der Spiegel interview—“only a god can save 
us”—to be disingenuous and evasive. 
I can sympathize with Relph’s dissatisfaction 
here, but I think it misses the point concerning what 
is at issue. Once we analyse the operation of techno-
logical modernity topologically, we can see how it 
actually transforms our experience of place in ways 
that are at odds with the underlying character of 
place, and the underlying character even of that 
mode of being that belongs to technological moder-
nity itself, but which it also conceals. 
My emphasis on the importance of concepts 
like openness, indeterminacy, wonder, questionabil-
ity, and associated modes of comportment is in-
tended to direct attention toward key elements in an 
experience of place that obscures neither our em-
beddedness in place and the nature of that em-
beddedness nor the character of place as such. 
Moreover, that we should look for a more con-
crete solution to the problems of technological 
modernity, while unsurprising, is also mistaken. Our 
contemporary situation is not the result of a process 
over which we, either collectively or individually, 
have mastery. Indeed, the desire for mastery and the 
appearance of the entire world as potentially subject 
to control is itself an integral element in the particu-
lar formation of the world that is technological 
modernity. The relinquishing of the desire for con-
trol and the recognition of the extent to which all-
encompassing solutions are beyond us will be key 
elements in that “other beginning” that might pres-
age the shift to a truly “post-modern,” “post-
technological” world.  
 
he later Heidegger’s apparently weary insis-
tence on the limits in our ability to change the 
world’s course should not be construed as a failure 
of vision or some lapse into quietistic resignation. It 
follows directly from a recognition of the essen-
tially placed character of human being and the limi-
tation and fragility following inevitably from it. 
If it were possible to reconfigure our current 
forms of social and political organisation around a 
recognition of such placedness, then we would have 
a solution to many of our contemporary ills. Yet 
there is no concrete way in which such a wholesale 
reconfiguration can be brought away in a directed 
and purposive manner. 
What we can do is work, as Heidegger sug-
gests, in the many small ways that are available to 
us, to reorient ourselves to our actual situation and 
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this, however, there is no “saving power” that we 
ourselves can exercise. 
 
eidegger’s Topology attempts to provide an 
account of the way in which place provides a 
starting point for Heidegger’ s thinking as well as an 
idea toward which it develops. Indeed, it is only in 
the very late thinking, from perhaps 1947 onward, 
that Heidegger’s topology emerges in a fully devel-
oped form (although a form that can only be appre-
ciated when viewed in terms of the problems in the 
earlier thinking to which it is also a response). 
If we are to take Heidegger as making a signifi-
cant contribution to the philosophical analysis of 
place in the 20th century, then it must be primarily 
on the basis of the later thinking rather than the ear-
lier. But the later thinking also makes demands on 
the reader that are much greater than those of the 
earlier work—demands that follow, in part, from 
Heidegger’ s own attempts to think topologically—
and as a result the later thinking is more prone to 




I had hoped that Heidegger’s Topology would 
go some way toward correcting this tendency, but if 
Relph’s comments are taken as an indication, the 
work would seem to have fallen short of at least one 
of its objectives. On the other hand, if the sort of 
topology or topography in which I take Heidegger 
to have been engaged and to which I take my own 
work to be a contribution does constitute a different, 
if not entirely unprecedented, mode of thinking, 
then perhaps one simply has to accept certain inevi-
table difficulties in the communication and elucida-
tion of that thinking. 
Heidegger’s Topology does not, however, stand 
alone. Not only does it seem to me to be supported 
by the work of others in the same field, most nota-
bly, by that of Ed Casey, but it should also be read 
against the background of my other work. In this 
respect, Heidegger’s Topology is only the second 
book in what should be a sequence of works that 
will together, I hope, provide a more fully elabo-
rated account of the philosophical topology that is 
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Building & Dwelling 
 
To spare and preserve is to “let be,” but not through a with-
drawal so much as a certain mode of engagement, and in 
“Building Dwelling Thinking,” the manner in which human 
beings are engaged with things and in the world is through 
that by which the idea of dwelling is itself introduced, 
namely, “building.” 
    Building is the activity that produces, that brings things 
forth, either through cultivation or through construction…. 
All human being involves building, and so stands in an im-
portant relation to the Greek “techne,” itself understood by 
Heidegger in terms of the disclosing or “letting-appear” that 
lies behind our word “technology.” 
    Yet the productive activity of building is not simply 
identical with technology, with any technique, nor with any 
technical enterprise such as architecture or engineering. 
Building is that mode of productive activity that articulates 
the world in a way that allows for human dwelling.  
    But this means that building must be understood as aris-
ing on the basis of dwelling rather than being that on which 
dwelling is itself based. Thus Heidegger writes that “Only 
if we are capable of dwelling, only then can we build.” 
Building is the productive activity through which human 
beings make a place for themselves in the world and so by 
means of which their own dwelling is articulated….  
    The building that is undertaken on the basis of our proper 
dwelling is a building that allows for such dwelling and so 
allows for the gathering of the fourfold—it is a building 
that itself spares and preserves through allowing human 
beings to engage with things in a way that reflects the uni-
tary and differing character of things. True building pro-
duces things that allow the world and the things that make 
up the world to come forth in their abundance and multi-
plicity—true building produces, as it also works in relation 
to, “things”; true building makes for, as it also arises in, 
places (Heidegger’s Topology, p. 271). 
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 pair of herons reside very close to our house. 
They are nesting now, and I am often stopped 
in my tracks in the early morning by the 
sound of their strangely guttural mating cries or the 
sight of their slow lolloping wing beat in unison as 
they fly by, one of them often carrying a dry branch 
in his or her beak. The White-faced Herons (Egretta 
novaehollandiae) stand over two feet tall, pale misty 
grey in color with yellow legs and rounded white face 




My partner Vicki has painted several watercolors 
of the heron, bringing patient observation and dec-
ades of painting experience to her deceptively simple 
and evocative depictions. She has also been working 
in a completely new medium for her—assembling 
pieces of driftwood to convey the essence of each of 
the shorebirds we encounter.  
When we climb down to the rocky beach imme-
diately below us, we pick our way through the morn-
ing’s offering from the sea—strands of seaweed, 
fragments of whelk, cowrie and oyster shell, plastic 
drink bottles, and driftwood pieces suggestive of bird 
necks, beaks, or bodies. We always have avian com-
pany—kelp gulls wailing and mewing; a tern dipping 
its wing slightly before plummeting into the water to 
dive for a fish; a pied cormorant, part fish, part bird, 
part snake, slipping below the water, then surfacing 
and slapping the water vigorously with its wings to 
gain purchase for takeoff when fully laden with fish. 
When we have gathered a good supply of the 
morning’s treasures, we carry them up to Vicki’s shed 
where a profusion of shapes are in all stages of being 
transformed from wood to bird. She has placed a 
delicate elongated driftwood heron in our kitchen 
window facing the water, opposite the wall on which 
hangs one of her watercolor herons. A 
 
ne recent morning, gazing out that window, I 
saw the heron with its rounded white face mo-
tionless at the edge of the water amid the grey ellip-
ses of rock in the mist. Its presence in living, 
sculpted, painted form brought forth several memo-
ries. One day we were watching the heron alight onto 
a large horizontal dead branch overlooking the shore. 
It perched, looking out over the water as intently as 
we were looking at it. My focus shifted from the 
heron to the branch, and I was startled to see how 
closely the end of the branch mirrored the shape of 
the bird. The angles between thrust forward head, 
sinuous neck, and spindly legs were the same. The 
tree ceased being a eucalypt of undistinguished shape 
and became the “heron tree.” Here was the very cor-
respondence between wood and live bird that Vicki 
was creating with her sculptures. 
O
The second memory was of the role that the 
heron played in our finding this place initially. We 
were relaxing with our friends Pete Hay and his wife 
Anna at their weekend place on Bruny Island after 
the successful conclusion of a “Sense of Place” col-
loquium in southern Tasmania. On our last morning, 
when we were due to fly back home to Sydney, Pete, 
a colloquium co-organizer and a passionate poet and 
place writer, suggested a pre-breakfast boating excur-
sion, to which I readily agreed.  
For no particular reason, we turned southward 
rather than northward as on our previous outings. 
13
Environmental & Architectural Phenomenology, Vol. 19 [2008], No.
ISSN: 1083-9194
Pete was in front in the rowboat with his two dogs 
alert in the prow, and we paddled behind in the canoe, 
enjoying the still waters of the estuary for the last 
time. He’d spied a white-faced heron by the shore 
and rowed closer in the hopes of photographing it. 
The bird did not oblige and each time flew a little fur-
ther on just as Pete prepared to photograph it. 
By the time we rounded yet another rocky prom-
ontory in our canoe, Vicki and I had grown concerned 
at how far we’d come and how long this expedition 
was taking, given how much time was needed to 
catch the Bruny ferry to the Tasmanian mainland and 
be at the airport by early afternoon. 
Just past the headland, the wide veranda of a 
simple house appeared in view, splendidly located on 
its own, overlooking the wooded coastal shore. Vicki 
exclaimed that she wanted it, or to be precise, 
“Wanna wanna wanna,” something I’d never heard 
her say before. I commented that the current owner 
would probably have an opinion on that statement. A 
few more strokes of the paddle brought us in sight of 
a “For Sale” sign on the shore. We were stunned. 
After failing to rouse anyone by calling out, we 
diverted Pete from his pursuit of the heron and per-
suaded him to hurry back to the shack so we could 
make inquiries. With a half hour to spare, we met 
with the owner on site, had a quick tour of the small 
and largely unfinished house, and essentially shook 
hands on the sale of the place.  
As for Vicki’s uncharacteristic utterance, we 
were humbled to later discover that the name the 
original Nuenonne Aboriginal inhabitants gave to 
Bruny Island was “Lunawanna-alonnah.” She had 
voiced something of an echo of the Aboriginal name 
for the island, and we subsequently learned that our 
new home had been the site of significant early con-
tact between the Nuenonne and representatives of the 
first Governor with ultimately tragic consequences 
when they were moved off the island. 
Vicki had just finished her doctoral thesis explor-
ing the experience of being-in-place, displacement, 
trauma, and the ethics of perception based in part on 
time she spent at the Aboriginal outstation of Utopia 
in the Northern Territory with Anmatyerr and Aly-
awarr Aboriginal women artists. Our relationship 
with Aboriginal people, their trauma and displace-
ment, had just taken a new turn in an uncanny way.  
 
here are several ways to view what happened 
that day. From one viewpoint, the heron was 
simply doing what herons do, keeping its distance 
and moving on as Pete got too close in his rowboat. 
At the same time, we have said on more than one oc-
casion that “heron” helped bring us here because we 
would never have ventured so far otherwise, and that 
the place called to us that morning. 
These are not glib lines. They are full of meaning 
that deepens with experience. Both views make sense 
to me despite their seemingly contradictory nature. 
Holding attitudes and experiences that are at odds 
with each other appears to be part of living here. It 
provides a creative tension—an impetus to think 
through questions of how the heron might somehow 
be an agent in the mysterious process of our unex-
pectedly moving here, or how meaningful it is to talk 
of intentionality in the more-than-human world. 
It is a matter of the heart as well as thought to 
pay attention to the feeling of affinity that sometimes 
rises in me when heron appears. Even the attitude 
that heron was only instinctively avoiding human 
contact comes from a feeling of respect, of valuing its 
otherness, and not wanting to reduce it to merely a 
figure in a human drama of my creation. 
I don’t want to make more of the event than is 
warranted, especially when there are so many practi-
cal environmental problems to deal with in our local-
ity that need my attention. I hope to mull over such 
issues in future letters, but for the moment saying that 
heron guided us here seems to be a way of expressing 
a feeling that something larger than my own concep-
tual mind or mere accident is at play. 
 
ithout consciously intending to, we have pro-
vided ourselves with the opportunity to put 
more fully into practice what we had been teaching in 
“Sense of Place” classes at the University of Western 
Sydney. Ecological sustainability, an essential aspect 
of inhabiting place, is more of an everyday matter 
here because we are not connected to power, water, 
or sewage. We generate our greatly reduced electric-
ity needs with solar panels and a wind turbine and 
rely on rainwater tanks and a dry composting toilet. 
Since we moved here full-time two years ago, we 
have embarked on a land regeneration project on our 
55 acres of overgrazed paddocks—we’ve removed 
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from local seed and 1000 native grasses for land re-
generation, wildlife habitat, and erosion control. 
Experientially, because we are on the island for 
about ten days at a time between trips to mainland 
Tasmania for provisions (there are no shops on north 
Bruny Island) and don’t watch television, we have a 
far more intense and ongoing experience of this one 
place. With no neighbors in view and facing an ex-
panse of estuarine shores and waters, we focus much 
attention on the more-than-human world that we are 





iving here is also precipitating changes in the   
“practices of place” that I have developed and 
written about previously: Goethean science, medita-
tion, bush regeneration, and investigation of local 
natural and human history. I had expected in my “re-
tirement” I would be able to implement this work 
more thoroughly and systematically, but life has 
proved otherwise. Much of my day is now spent out-
side spraying thistles in the paddocks, planting trees 
and grasses, maintaining the tree guards, digging in 
the vegetable bed and so on, whereas nearly all my 
working days at the university were spent inside at 
the computer screen, in classrooms, or at meetings. 
The rare occasions when I have ventured down 
to the shore to undertake some Goethean science, for 
example, have been rewarding enough but no longer 
seem sufficient in themselves, perhaps because the 
context within which I am carrying them out has 
changed so radically.  Rather, they are pointing to-
ward a more flexible and integrated way of being 
outdoors here, enabling me to move in and out of 
task-oriented action, sensuous appreciation, and intui-
tive or meditative states, without allocating certain 
periods of time for each. 
I say “pointing the way toward,” because for 
much of the time, the directed activities tend to 
overwhelm other sensibilities that emerge only as an 
occasional glimpse. Even though progress is slow, it 
has increasingly felt contrary to the spirit of these 
practices, as well as being impractical, to schedule 
them into a part of the day. 
 
 felt surrounded that morning by the many mani-
festations of heron in front of me. Heron wasn’t 
simply “out there” in all its forms, manifesting what I 
could best describe as poised attentiveness. The feel-
ing was also a personal matter. My everyday person-
ality is not characterized by either poise or attentive-
ness, yet these are qualities that attract me and to 
which I aspire. 
The possibility of bringing them more to life 
within has opened up, but it is a razor-edged possibil-
ity. On the one side, there are days when it seems that 
all I can see in the mirror of nature here are my own 
shortcomings—mental turbulence in the face of the 
reflective waters, resistance to change in the midst of 
the continuous flux of wind and waves. 
On the other side is the danger of constructing a 
narrative that obscures as much as it reveals, of tell-
ing a simple storyline that belies the complex, con-
tradictory, and erratic nature of what I’ m experienc-
ing or makes too much of what is happening. The 
middle way between self-doubting and self-deluding 
stories seems to involve holding such stories lightly, 
having an attitude of quiet, open-hearted acceptance 
of what is—including my own human foolishness— 
and care for ourselves as integral parts of this place. 
L 
  
s I write this, I am also very aware of the pre-
cariousness of the situation we all face. There 
are many threats, such as tree dieback, erosion, and 
introduced weeds, to this narrow fringe of coastal 
woodland, and our capacity to keep living here can 
be so easily broken by illness or misadventure. 
A
Yet, heron nests are being built, the recently 
planted trees are putting down roots, as are we, so 
there is hope for the new season. I sense that we are 
participating—heron, Vicki and I—in an unfolding 
relationship that has many dimensions. 
We are becoming familiar with each other’s hab-
its. Our feeling for heron grows as the story of our 
being here develops. We are working physically to 
create more habitat for birds. We move quietly to re-
spect everyone’s space as much as we can, and some 
of our avian friends are approaching us more closely 
these days. Vicki’s creative response to the presence 
of heron and the other birds is flourishing. 
My wonderment and appreciation of the whole 
process grows as I write my way into it. Writing, too, 
is one of the ways in which I am participating in this 
three-way connection. It is helping to illuminate the 
depth of the relationships, how to hold lightly the 
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